Some Legal Aspects of Life Insurance Trusts by Hanna, John
Jainary, 193o
SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE
TRUSTS
JOHN HANNA
INTRODUCTION
A life insurance trust is a trust whose res consists, in whole
or in part, of a life insurance policy. 1 While an historian might
find early counterparts of the insurance trust,2 it is for all prac-
tical purposes as contemporaneous as the radio, and its possibilities
are as uncertain. In fact, the development of the insurance trust
dates from I920, and the $700,oo0,ooo in insurance policies placed
in trust in 1928 makes it almost possible to designate that year
as marking their real beginning, although policies amounting to
$541,ooo,ooo were assigned to trustees in the five years from
1923 to I928.3
Two principal types of life insurance trusts are recognized,
depending upon the method of paying the insurance premiums.
In an unfunded trust, while the trustee holds the policies, the
1 The author is indebted, for help in the preparation of this article, to his
assistant, Mr. Samuel Silverman, Decisions Editor of the Columbia Law Re-
view, and to Messrs. Charles Looker, Robert L. Redfield, Jr., David M.
Solinger, and Miss Helen H. Robinson, members of the 1929 seminar in
decedents' estates at the Columbia University Law School.
2Bassil v. Lister, 9 Hare 177 (Eng. 1851) is a case in which the English
Chancery Court sustained the legality of an arrangement by which Lister in-
sured the lives of his two sons and by will provided for the continuance of
premium payments out of the income of his estate. This English trust differed
from modern life insurance trusts in that the policies were not on the life of
the creator or settlor, and the trust was created by will, thus taking effect only
at the death of the settlor.
The Girard Trust Company of Philadelphia established, on June 13, 1869,
what appears to have been the first life insurance trust in this country. The
Providence Life and Trust Company of Philadelphia, on January 27, 1877,
wrote a life insurance trust under which the settlor assigned all his interest
;n a policy upon his life to the company, which as trustee was to collect the
insurance money from itself as an insurance company, paying the income to
the settlor's widow for life and the principal, at her death, outright to his
daughter. The Northern Trust Company of Chicago was the first trust com-
pany, which was not also an insurance company, to receive a life insurance
trust. This was on March 18, 1897. See STEPHENSON, LiviNG TRuSTS (1926)
1g; (1926) 42 TRUST COMePANIES 867.
' See the address by F. H. Sisson, 1928-A Record Year for Trust Service,
published by the Guaranty Trust Company, New York. Mr. Sisson reports the
results of a survey made by the Trust Company Division of the American
Bankers Association.
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creator or settlor pays the premiums directly to the insurance
company. The trustee has no active duties until the death of the
insured. Upon the happening of that event, he collects the pro-
ceeds of the policies, and invests or otherwise disposes of them as
the settlor has directed in the trust agreement. The unfunded
trust is the more popular form,4 since it requires the least initial
capital; and most active business men think they can invest their
own accumulated funds more profitably than can a trust company.
In a funded trust, the settlor, at the time of the agreement, deposits
with the trust company sufficient money or securities so that the
trustee will be able to pay the premiums on the policies out of the
income of the fund. The trust res, on the death of the settlor,
consists not only of the proceeds of the insurance policies, as in
the unfunded trust, but also of the fund from which the money
for premiums has been derived.
Minor variations from the two main types are found in the
cumulative and retiring insurance trusts. In the cumulative type
the settlor pays periodically to the trustee a fixed sum which is
more than enough to cover the premiums on the policies. The
trustee pays the premiums and invests the surplus. This invested
surplus eventually becomes large enough to provide an income
sufficient to pay the premiums, and an ordinary funded trust has
been created. In the retiring insurance trust, as the surplus fund
grows, insurance is retired, resulting eventually in an ordinary
trust of personal property without insurance features.
A classification of insurance trusts from the standpoint of
function, instead of method of creation, would require mention of
the business life insurance trust. Its purpose is to provide a fund
*for the purchase of a deceased partner's interest by the surviving
partners', or the purchase of a deceased shareholder's interest in
a close corporation by the surviving shareholders. The life of
each person concerned is insured to the extent of the value of his
interest, and the policies are made payable to the trustee under the
trust agreement. While it would be possible to have the policies
payable directly to the survivors, it is usually advantageous to have
'Leading trust companies estimate that about 95 per cent of insurance
trusts are unfunded.
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a trustee in order to assure all parties that the business plans con-
templated when the policies were executed will be carried out.'
The forms of business life insurance trusts are much less
standardized than the forms for the ordinary funded and unfunded
trusts. If a partnership, with two partners having an equal
interest in the business, wishes to set up a business insurance trust,
each partner ihsures the life of the other, making the policy pay-
able to the trustee, and obligates himself to maintain the insurance
so long as the agreement remains in force. The agreement pro-
vides that the survivor shall have the right and the duty to pur-
chase the other's share. If a close corporation is involved, it is
sometimes provided that the corporation shall take out the insur-
ance, pay the premimns, and buy the shares of the deceased share-
holder. The power of a corporation to assume such obligations
is doubtful in many jurisdictions, and some trust companies, on
that account, will not accept such trusts. In New York, for
example, Section 664 of the Penal Law 6 provides in part as
follows:
"A director of a stock corporation, who concurs in any
vote or act of the directors of such corporation, or any of
them, by which it is intended:
"5. To apply any portion of. the funds of such corpo-
ration, except surplus, directly or indirectly, to the purchase
of shares of its own stock . . . Is guilty of a misde-
meanor."
In Topken, Loring & Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz ' an
employee of a corporation had agreed to sell, and the corporation
had agreed to buy, certain shares of stock in the corporation owned
by the employee. The employee refused to sell. Although there
was no evidence that the corporation had no surplus, the New
York Court of Appeals denied specific performance to the corpo-
ration, despite the fact that the shares were unobtainable in the
market. The court decided that, since the corporation might not
have had a surplus at the time of performance, its promise to buy
THE FINANCIAL DIGEST, May, 1928, 4.
6N. Y. PENAL LAW (1917) § 664, N. Y. ANN. CoNs. LAWS (2d ed. 1917)
5732.
7249 N. Y. 2o6, 163 N. E. 735 (1928).
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might not be enforceable; hence there was no consideration for
the promise to sell.
A further difficulty might arise if the corporation were the
beneficiary of the insurance policy, and the insured shareholder
died in straitened circumstances. Statutes generally provide that
beneficiaries of insurance policies are entitled to the proceeds as
against the creditors of the insured, with some limitations," but
it is by no means settled that such statutes apply when a corpora-
tion is the beneficiary. These difficulties may be avoided by
having each shareholder take out policies on the lives of the others
for an amount sufficient to buy his proportionate part of the
shares of a deceased shareholder.
Since one of the main objects of the business trust is to
assure a fair price for the shares in a partnership or corporation,
the clauses in the trust agreement, fixing the price, are among the
most significant. The parties may, and sometimes do, agree that
this price shall be determined by the amount of insurance. More
often an arrangement is adopted by which the value of the busi-
ness, including its good will, shall be revalued periodically. A
further desirable provision is to change the amount of the insur-
ance to correspond to the changed valuation. If the business
insurance trust involves a close corporation, the shareholders, on
making the agreement and taking out the policies, will generally
assign their shares to the trustee, to facilitate carrying out the pro-
visions of the trust on the death of a shareholder.
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
One of the chief advantages claimed for insurance trusts is
that they enable the settlor to build up a fund for his dependants,
which will be free from the claims of his creditors. It will be
wise at the outset to distinguish between the rights of creditors of
the cestni qie vie (the person on whose life the insurance is car-
ried) and the creditors of the settlor or insured, where the settlor
or insured is not the cestui que vie. A cestui que vie who is
SNEW YORK INsURANcE LAW (1928) § 55-a, N. Y. CONs. LAWS ANN.
(Supp. 1928) 507.
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neither the insured nor a beneficiary has no interest in the policy,
and his creditors have no claim to it.9
No cases seem to have presented squarely the problem of the
rights of creditors of the settlor in a funded insurance trust. So
far as the insurance itself is concerned, if the insurance is payable
to the estate of the insured, the proceeds must be distributed by
his executor among the creditors of the estate. 10 Where the
policy is payable to some third person, it would seem to follow
that, if the insured has only a privilege of paying the premiums,
and all rights are vested in the beneficiary, the insured's creditors
or their legal representatives are entitled to nothing. It is now
well settled, in every state except Wisconsin," that, if the right to
change the beneficiary has not been reserved, the interest of the
beneficiary is vested in the sense that it cannot be defeated if the
conditions precedent to the duty to pay are satisfied.'1 2  It is no
longer the property of the insured, and his creditors can claim no
share of the proceeds, 13 unless there has been a fraudulent con-
veyance.
14
These rights of the beneficiary were at first secured through
statutes intended to protect the wife and children of the insured.
The two earliest enactments provided that a married woman could
take out insurance on the life of her husband and receive the
proceeds free from claims of his creditors or their representa-
tives. 15 Later statutes in most of the states are to the same
effect. In North Carolina a similar provision is thought impor-
'In re Hartman's Estate, 126 Misc. 862, 215 N. Y. Supp. 802 (1926),
aff'd 220 App. Div. 755, 222 N. Y. Supp. 817 (1927).
"0 VANCE, INSURANCE (1904) 405.
"it re Breitung's Estate, 78 Wis. 33, 46 N. W. 891, 47 N. W. 17 (189o);
WIS. STAT. (1927) § 206.
' Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy (1922) 31
YALE L. J. 343.
'In accord with this view see Matter of Thompson, 184 N. Y. 36, 43, 76
N. E. 870, 872 (I9O6), where the court said: "The amount of insurance pur-
chased by the excess of premiums paid out of the husband's property did not
belong to him in his life time and formed no part of his estate after his-death.
He never owned-any part of the policy which belonged wholly to his
wife... "
I'VANCE, INSURANCE (1904) 407.
IN. Y. Laws 1840, c. 8o; Mass. Laws 1844, c. 82, §§ 2, 3. See 2 JoycE,
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1917) § 879.
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tant enough to warrant its being made a part of the constitution. 1
In Pennsylvania the statute insures the proceeds to the wife,
children, or other relative dependent on the insured, 17 while the
Massachusetts statute applies to the proceeds of any policy,lS as
does the recent New York statute.' 9 Attention should be called
to the appropriate provisions of the California Code. It is pro-
vided that all moneys and benefits accruing from insurance shall
inure to the named beneficiary, if the annual premiums do not
exceed $5oo, and, if they do, "a like exemption shall exist which
shall bear the same proportion to the moneys, benefits, privileges,
and immunities so accruing or growing out of such insurance
that said five hundred dollars bears to the whole annual premiums
paid." 20
The New York statute 21 is similar to that of California,
except that all the excess is made "primarily liable for the hus-
band's debts". This excess, however, cannot be reached directly,
but only by a bill in equity, and after the other assets of the estate
have been found insufficient.22  A creditor need not wait for the
death of the insured and perhaps run up against the bar of the
Statute of Limitations, but may, during the life of the insured,
impose a lien on proceeds procured with premiums in excess of
$5oo, and may enjoin the insured and his wife from assigning
the policy except in subordination to the rights of creditors.
23
Just what the effect is in New York of a reserved right to change
the beneficiary is not clear. One case indicates that, if this right
is reserved, the creditor will be entitled to no rights under the
policy,24 while an earlier case seems to reach the opposite con-
clusion .
2
'IN. C. CONSTITUTION, art. X, § 7.
'PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 12262.
"MAss. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 175, § 125.
"Subra note 8.
' CAL. CODES OF CIv. PRoC. (Deering, 1923) § 69o (18).
'N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW (Igo) § 52; N. Y. ANN. Coxs. LAWS (2d ed.
i917) 1887.
-' Matter of Thompson, supra note 3.
'Stokes v. Amerman, 121 N. Y. 337, 24 N. E. 8i (i89o).
" Grems v. Traver, 87 Misc. 644, 148 N. Y. Supp. 200 (1914), aff'd. 164
App. Div. 968, 149 N. Y. Supp. io85 (914).
Cavagnaro v. Thompson, 78 Misc. 687, 138 N. Y. Supp. 81g (1912).
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The New York law has recently been changed by Section
55-a of the Insurance Law,26 which provides:
"If a policy of insurance . . . is effected by any
person on his own life or on another life, in favor of a person
other than himself, . . . the lawful beneficiary or assignee
thereof, other than the insured or the person so effecting such
insurance . . . shall be entitled to its proceeds and avails
against creditors and representative of the insured and of the
person effecting same, whether or not the right to change
the beneficiary is reserved and permitted . . . Provided
. . that . . premiums . . . paid with intent to
defraud creditors . . . shall enure to their benefit."
This statute has been held applicable in bankruptcy proceedings.
2
7
The court said:
"while the insured may still change the beneficiary, and
appoint to himself under the reserved power, by reason of
the New York Insurance Law, he cannot be compelled to do
this, as he would have been prior to the enactment of 55-a
because to do so would deprive the beneficiaries of their
interest." 28
The New York Court of Appeals has held recently. in
Chatham Phenix National Bank v. Croszey,-' that the provision
of Section 52 of the Domestic Relations Law making insurance
moneys acquired by the payment of premiums in excess of $5oo,
and in fraud of creditors, liable for the husband's debts, was im-
pliedly repealed by the new Section 55-a of the Insurance Law.
This decision reversed the holding of the Appellate Division to the
effect that when a husband insures his life in favor of his wife he
acts as her agent, and therefore it is not a case of insurance
"effected by any person . . . in favor of a person other than
himself"30
'Supra note 8.
1 In re Messinger, 29 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
'Ibid. at 16o.
'25I N. Y. 189 (1929).
30224 App. Div. 58, 229 N. Y. Supp. 140 (1928). The court cited Wagner
v. Thieriot, 203 App. Div. 757, 197 N. Y. Supp. 56o (1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y.
588, 142 N. E. 295 (1923).
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During the life of the insured the question usually arises
under the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Section 6 allows the bankrupt
the "exemptions which are prescribed by the State laws in force
at the time of the filing of the petition". 31 Section 70 in effect
provides that all property shall pass to the trustee in bankruptcy
which the bankrupt could, by any means, have transferred, pro-
vided that, if the bankrupt has a life insurance policy with a cash
surrender value, payable to himself, he may pay to the trustee
such cash surrender value and then hold "such policy free from
the claims of creditors participating in the distribution of his
estate". 32  The relation of these sections was decided by the case
of Holden v. Stratton,33 where the court held that Section 70 was
limited by Section 6, rather than that Section 6 was limited by
Section 70; that is, that insurance exempt by the state statute did
not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, even though it could have
been transferred by the bankrupt. The construction of the pro-
viso in Section 7o-a came before the court in the case of Burling-
ham v. Crouse,34 where the question presented was whether the
statute meant that all insurance passes to the trustee in bankruptcy
but the bankrupt can regain those with a cash surrender value,
upon payment of such surrender value, or that only those policies
pass which have a cash surrender value. The court, by its deci-
sion, adopted the latter construction, saying,
"We think it was the purpose of Congress to pass to the
trustee that sum which was available to the bankrupt at the
time of the bankruptcy as a cash asset, otherwise to leave to
the insured the benefit of his life insurance." 35
But the Supreme Court has not been too lenient on the bankrupt,
for it has held that, though there is no express provision for a
cash surrender value, yet, if it is the custom of the company to
pay one, the policy has a cash surrender value under the act.36
"130 STAT. 548 (1899), II U. S. C. § 24 (1926).
230 ST&T. 565 (1899), 11 U. S. C. § 1O (1926).
SI8 U. S. 202, 25 Sup. Ct. 656 (igo5).
U228 U. S. 459, 33 Sup. Ct. 564 (1913).
'Ibid. 473, 33 Sup. Ct. at 568.
' Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U. S. 202, 27 Sup. Ct. 488 (I9O7).
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There was formerly a great deal of confusion in the lower federal
courts as to the effect of a reserved right to change the bene-
ficiary ; 37 but the Supreme Court finally settled this question, in
the case of Cohen v. Samuels,35 by allowing the trustee to have
the cash surrender value of policies payable to a person other than
the insured, but in which the insured had reserved a right to
change the beneficiary.
It is pertinent here to consider the policy of the law in regard
to the claims of creditors to the insurance of their debtor, because,
for the purposes of the principal problem, this is more important
than the settled law. The statutes, in general, protect the bene-
ficiary from claims of the insured's creditors. It is submitted
that this should be the law, even in the absence of statutes, because
it is the logical result of the proposition that the interest of the
beneficiary is vested and indefeasible, and it is in line with the
policy which gave rise to the statutory declarations. The attitude
of the courts is clearly stated in Weil v. farquis:3'
"The policy of the law, even where the rights of cred-
itors may be adversely affected, favors the wife to whom her
husband has attempted to secure the benefit of insurance upon
his life
A striking example of the application of this policy is contained
in the leading case of Central Bank v. Hune.40  Hume had sev-
eral life insurance policies payable to his wife. For about five
years prior to this action he had paid premiums on them, although
during that time he was insolvent. After his death a creditor
sought to get the money paid for premiums while the deceased was
insolvent. The court decided in favor of the wife, with the result
that the creditors got nothing. The court said:
In re Orear, 178 Fed. 632 (C. C. A. 8th, I9io), holding that the cash
surrender value of such a policy passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. Contra:
in re Young, 2o8 Fed. 373 (N. D. Ohio 1912).
3'245 U. S. 5o, 38 Sup. Ct. 36 (1917).
*256 Pa. 6o8, 613, 1o At. 70, 71 (1917).
40 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sup. Ct. 41 (1888). This situation is treated in Williston,
Can an Insolvent Insure His Life for His Wife's Benefit? (1891) 25 AM. L.
REv. 185.
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"Conceding, then, in the case in hand, that Hume paid
the premiums out of his own money, when insolvent, yet, as
Mrs. Hume and the children survived him, and the contracts
covered their insurable interest, it is difficult to see upon what
ground the creditors, or the administrators representing them,
can take away from these dependent ones that which was
expressly secured to them in the event of the death of their
natural supporter." 41
Whether this attitude will continue is, of course, difficult to say.
If insurance is used as a protection or in the nature of an
indemnity contract, the courts will probably favor the beneficiary;
but, on the other hand, if, in order to evade creditors or taxation,
insurance is used merely as a device for enlarging the estate, one
cannot be nearly so confident in predicting the judicial attitude.
Turning to the specific problem of the creditor's rights against
an insurance trust, the simplest case is one where the trust fund is
to become a part of the estate of the settlor, or is to be paid over
to his executor and distributed according to the will of the settlor.
During the life of the insured the trust would be for the benefit of
the settlor; he would be the sole cestui que trust; and his creditors
would be entitled to rights under the insurance contract and to
the securities held in trust. The trustee can have no interest in
the proceeds, so that the fact that he is the named beneficiary
should make no difference. After the death of the insured, the
whole trust, having become, by its terms, part of the assets of the
creator, would, of course, be available to his creditors.
A more difficult problem is raised if the ultimate beneficiary
of the trust is the wife of the settlor. Let us assume first that the
trust is irrevocable, and that no right to change the beneficiary has
been reserved in the contract of insurance. If there has been no
intent to defraud creditors, it is difficult to see how this trust
differs from any other trust created inter vivos. This would
undoubtedly be so, unless the court should adopt the suggestion
made by Surrogate O'Brien in It re Hartnan's Estate,4 2 that an
insurance trust is one for the benefit of the settlor because today
"1 Central Bank v. Hume, supra note 4o, at 2o8, 9 Sup. Ct. at 45.
'Supra note 8.
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every man feels a need for insurance and so the trust is one which
gives solace and comfort to the creator by providing for this need.
Moreover, even without the trust, the beneficial interest of the
wife in the insurance would be vested and so the husband would
have no rights which his creditors could claim. It would seem
clear that, on the death of the insured, in those states which pro-
vide that the proceeds of insurance shall be exempt from claims of
creditors of the insured or the husband, such creditors could have
no rights. In New York and California, however, the question
is more complicated, because of the peculiar provisions of the
statutes of those states.
The problem is squarely raised whether the courts will give
to this new device the legal consequences of an insurance contract
and allow the creditors their share, or regard it as a trust and
refuse to allow the creditors anything. In New York the statute4"
clearly provides that proceeds procured with premiums of more
than $500 shall be liable to creditors' claims, in the case of an
unfunded trust. Whether this will be extended to cover a funded
trust would seem to depend on the attitude of the court. If a
court should regard the iunded trust with favor, or the statute
with disfavor, it would not be compelled to extend the rule, because
a distinction could be made on the ground that, in an unfunded
trust, the trust res was only the insurance proceeds, which could
be identified and claimed by a creditor. In a funded trust, how-
ever, the proceeds become an integral part of the trust created inter
vivos, and, if the creditors could not attack the whole trust, they
could not attack a part of it. It would be more logical to argue
that the difference between a funded and unfunded trust is not so
great as to make it necessary to refuse creditors rights in the one
when they are given rights in the other, because the insurance pro-
ceeds come to the trustee in cash, and there is little difficulty in
removing it, or the securities bought with it, without disturbing
the trust as a whole. It is true that in the past the wife's interest
as the beneficiary of an insurance policy has been protected by the
courts; but, if it seems to the court, especially in the first few cases
'Supra note 21.
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to arise, that the trust is being used to evade just claims, it may
easily be that the trust device will be ignored.
Suppose that the trust is revocable. Clearly, under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the trust assets are available to creditors.4 4  But if
the trust is by its terms irrevocable, and yet the contract of insur-
ance has in'it a reserved right to change the beneficiary, the same
problem would arise as has been discussed previously, and the
result of the case would depend on which of the two clauses the
court thought should govern.
No funded insurance trust has yet been held invalid as an
accumulation, 4 but, if one should be, other questions would arise.
If the income goes to the settlor, then it would be a trust for the
benefit of the settlor and so subject to his creditors.40 But if the
income goes to the next eventual estate,4 7 the questions would,
from the point of view of a creditor, be the same as if the trust
were not invalid as an accumulation.
Thus it may be suggested that a funded insurance trust has
no legal functions which are essentially different from insurance.
In other words, the purpose of a funded insurance trust is to
accomplish that which insurance alone accomplishes, unless there
is a desire to avoid liabilities such as taxation or creditors' claims.
In view of this, it is submitted that if insurance trusts are a useful
device their successful execution should be aided and not hindered
by the courts, but, on the other hand, where an attempt is made
to set up the trust in order to avoid duties and liabilities which
would otherwise attach to the insurance, the technical bar of a
trust should not be permitted to be effectively interposed.
Creditors of the beneficiary of a funded insurance trust are
faced with few problems that are peculiar to such trusts. In gen-
eral, their rights will depend on the nature of the beneficiary's
interest, which will, in turn, be determined by the terms of the
trust. After the interest of the beneficiary vests in possession,
"Supra note 32.
'5 See Bogert, Funded Insurance Trusts and the Ride agaist Accumula-
tions (1924) 9 CORN. L. Q. 113. See also N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW
(1923) § I6.
GLENN, CREDITORS' RIGHTS AND REmEDIES (1915) § 40.
'7N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW (1923) § 63.
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the insurance proceeds become a part of the trust res and the
whole should be treated as any other trust of personalty. From
the point of view of the beneficiary this trust has no characteristics
of insurance, and is not different from a situation where the
insured makes the policy payable to his executor and directs the
executor to hold the money in trust for the named beneficiary.
43
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
A pitfall carefully to be avoided in the creation of life insur-
ance trusts is the rule against perpetuities. While an extended
discussion of this highly technical subject is not within the scope
of this article,49 a brief mention of the rule, pointing out the main
problems involved in the application of the rule to insurance trusts,
will not be out of place.
The rule against perpetuities, designed to aid the free circu-
lation of property, requires that by the end of a certain period
there shall be persons alive who, by joining, can convey absolute
title to the property, and that by the end of that period the interest
of each person in that property shall have become fixed and certain
(i. e., have vested) as vested life estates, vested remainders, etc.
If, by any possibility, these conditions might not be satisfied within
S In most states the settlor can provide in the trust instrument that the
interest of the beneficiary in the life income from a trust shall be inalienable
and free from the claims of the beneficiary's creditors. He cannot, in general,
so limit a beneficiary's interest in the principal fund. Therefore, if a settlor
provided that his son should receive the income from the proceeds of the policy
until he was thirty, and that the son should then receive the principal fund, the
settlor could provide that the only interest which the son could assign, or which
would be liable for his debts, would be the right to receive the principal at the
age of thirty. In New York and several other states the settlor cannot, in
general, render an alienable trust inalienable; but the statute provides that the
interest of a beneficiary to collect the income of real or personal property and
apply it to the use of, or pay it over to, the beneficiary, is inalienable and ex-
empt from his debts up to a sum reasonably necessary for his support and
maintenance. This sum varies with the person and usually is liberal. N. Y.
REAL PROPERTY LAW (1923) § 1o3; N. Y. PERsoN:L PROPERTY LAW (1923)
§ 15.
The validity of restraints on alienation in the different states is discussed
in GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION (2d ed. 1895). For the rule in each state,
see LORING, A TRUSTER'S HANDBOOK (4th ed. 1928). See also Griswold,
Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust (1929) 43
HARV. L. RaV. 63.
"9For extended discussions, see GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d
ed. 1915); KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920); CHAPIN, SUSPENSION
OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION (3d ed. 1928). Kales writes chiefly about
Illinois law and Chapin about the law of New York.
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the permissible period, the whole gift is bad. At common law
this period was twenty-one years after the death of the survivor
of any number of persons who were alive at the time of the crea-
tion of the interests, with an allowance between the death and the
beginning of the twenty-one years of an actual period of gestation
of an infant conceived, but not born, before the death of such
survivor.50 In some states this period has been changed by
statute.51
Where an actual minority is a part of the permitted period,
the minority need not be that of a person in being at the creation
of the interests, but the minor must be born, or at least conceived,
before the end of the lives in being at the creation of the interests.
In all cases, the measuring "lives in being" must be in being
at the date of the creation of the interests involved.5 2  In the case
of a will, this means at the testator's death, since that is the date
as of which the will speaks, and not the date of the execution of
the will. In the case of any other instrument, the lives must be
in existence at the date of the instrument. Since very few insur-
ance trusts are created by will, most of them fall into the latter
category. The difference becomes important in attempting to
provide for after-born children, who will, of course, be in being at
the date of the testator's death, but who are not in being at the date
of the trust agreement.
Although the duration of a trust is, in general, not limited
by the rule against perpetuities,5 3 yet, if the interest of the bene-
ficiaries of the trust is inalienable, in New York, and other juris-
dictions having similar statutes, the trust must be limited so as to
end of necessity within the permitted period from the date of the
trust instrument, even though the interests of all the parties have
finally vested.54  In New York 55 the interest of the beneficiary
of a trust in which the duty of the trustee is to receive the rents
'See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 49, c. V and c. V1.
' See appendix for these changes.
'Gray, op. cit. supra note 49, § 201.
'3Ibid. §§ 232-245(h).
:' Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (N. Y. 1835) ; cf. OKLA. COMP. STAT.
ANx. (1921) § 8412.
1N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW (1923) § -o3; N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY
LAW (923) § 15.
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and income of real or personal property and apply them to the use
of, or pay them over to, the beneficiary, is inalienable by statute.
This is the usual type of trust.
Therefore, the case of greatest difficulty presents itself in
New York, where, in addition to the statutory inalienability of
the beneficiaries' interests, there are the statutes limiting the period
of the rule to two lives in being at the date of the trust instrument.
Therefore, a trust to divide the income from the insurance pro-
ceeds among A, B, and C, three named persons in being, and, on
the death of the survivor of them, to pay the principal to D,
another named person in being, would be invalid in New York,
though valid in most other jurisdictions. The interest of each
beneficiary is vested, but the trust is not to end until the expiration
of three lives in being at the date of the trust instrument.
In jurisdictions which do not follow the New York statutes,
the duration of trusts is not limited by the period of the rule, even
though the interestg of the beneficiaries are inalienable.
As has already been indicated, the desires of most settlors
can be accomplished in any jurisdiction, without violating the rule,
provided the rule is considered at the time the trust instrument is
drawn.
It seems that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to
the settlement options of insurance companies, although this has
been doubted.50
INSURANCE TRUSTS AND THE LAW OF ACCUMULATIONS
The Century Dictionary defines an accumulation as,
"The adding of the interest or income of a fund to the
principal, pursuant to the provisions of a will or deed pre-
venting its being expended. The law imposes restrictions on
the power of a testator or creator of a trust to prohibit thus
the present beneficial enjoyment of a fund in order to increase
it for a future generation." 5'
See HORTON, POWER OF AN INSURED TO CONTROL THE PROCEEDS OF His
POLcIEs (x926) c. IV.
6- CENTURY DICTIONARY & CYCLOPEDIA (1914) 41. Cited with approval
in Thorn v. De Breteuil, 86 App. Div. 405, 83 N. Y. Supp. 849 (1903).
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Black's Law Dictionary states that,
"When an executor or other trustee masses the rents,
dividends, and other income which he receives, treats it as a
capital, invests it, makes a new capital of the income derived
therefrom, invests that, and so on, he is said to accumulate
the fund, and the capital and accrued income thus procured
constitute accum idations." 58
The test of an accumulation which is used most frequently by
the courts is that found in Hascall v. King, 9 wherein it is stated
that the disposition of an estate which the rule aims to prevent is
such as would deprive someone of the present enjoyment of each
and every dollar of the net income and augment the value of the
trust estate.
Prior to 18oi, when the Thellusson Act 00 went into effect,
there were no statutory restrictions on accumulations in Anglo-
American law; nor, indeed, had the limitation beyond which an
accumulation was invalid at common law been decided. There
were, to be sure, decisions to the effect that an accumulation not
in excess of the permissible limitation under the rule against per-
petuities was valid, 1 but no case arose in which the estate was
bound to vest within the permissible period under the rule against
perpetuities, but which directed an accumulation beyond this
period.
On July 2I, 1797, Peter Isaac Thellusson 62 died, devising his
property to trustees, to accumulate the income during the lives of
his sons, grandsons, and grandsons' children living at his death,
of whom there were seven and two en ventre sa mere, and then,
at the death of the survivor, to transfer the property in three lots
to the then living eldest male descendants of his three sons. The
will was attacked by the Thellusson family on the ground, inter
alia, that the accumulation was directed for too long a period, but
BLACK, LAW DrcrioARY (2d ed. i9io) 19.
162 N. Y. 134, 145, 56 N. E. 515, 518 (19oo).
0039 & 40 GEo. III, c. 98 (18oo).
" Siee Duke of Bridgwater v. Egerton, 2 Ves. Sr. 122 (Eng. 175o) ; Bullock
v. Stones, 2 Ves. Sr. 521 (Eng. 1754); Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227
(Eng. 1798), iI Ves. 112 (Eng. 1805). See also 4 KENT, COMMENTARrES
(08o5) 285.
Thelusson is often spelled Thellusson, and sometimes Thelluson.
362 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the court declared itself powerless to hold the accumulation invalid
at common law.
It should be noted in connection with the Thellusson case that
the testator's residuary property at the date of his decease had an
estimated value of £6oo,ooo. Mr. Morgan, of the Metropolitan
Life Assurance Society of England, the best known actuary of
his day, computed that the probable term of this accumulation was
close to eighty years, and that, assuming it would increase at the
current low rate of five per cent per annum, it would in seventy-
five years, amount to £23,299,6i 1.'3 The staggering proportions
to which the corpus of this trust might grow, 64 coupled with the
lack of any restraint upon the right to accumulate, resulted in the
passage of the Thellusson Act."5 This act provides that accumu-
lations are valid only:
(a) during the life of the grantor;
(b) for a term of twenty-one years from his death;
(c) during the minority of anyone who shall be living at the
time of the grantor's death;
(d) during the minority of one who, under the trusts of the
instrument, would, for the time being, if of full age, be
entitled to the income.
These periods are alternative and only one may be chosen; two
or more of them cannot be made consecutive periods for accumu-
lation.66  Unlike limitations which violate the rule against
perpetuities, a direction which violates the statute restraining
accumulations is not entirely void, but is valid to the extent of
such one of the four statutory periods as is operative, and is
invalid only for the excess over such statutory period.
6 7
See HAIGRAVE, TREATISE ON THE THELUSSON ACT (1842) 6, 7.
A friend of the author reports that one of the Thelusson descendants
stated in his presence that the entire corpus of the trust was consumed by the
litigation and that, in fact, Mr. Thelusson's descendants received nothing.
' Supra note 6o; It re Lady Rosslyn's Trust, I6 Sim. 391 (Eng. 1848).
'Wilson v. Wilson, i Sim. (N. S.) 288 (Eng. 1851); Jagger v. Jagger,
25 Ch. Div. 729 (1883); In re Errington, 76 L. T. 616 (1897).
Griffiths v. Vere, 9 Ves. 127 (Eng. 1803) ; Langdon v. Simson, 12 Ves.
295 (Eng. 18o6) ; Shaw v. Rhodes, I Myl. & C. i35 (Eng. 1836).
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In 1828 New York passed a statute making accumulations
valid during a minority only,"8 and then only if solely for the
benefit of the minor involved. At present Illinois and Pennsyl-
vania follow England. Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota and Wis-
consin follow New York with reference to realty; Alabama is
also in accord with New York as to realty, but, in addition, per-
mits an accumulation of the rents and profits thereof which does
not exceed ten years.0 9 Indiana and Montana follow New York
with reference to personalty. 0
The limit beyond which an accumulation may not be directed
at common law has never been decided. There are cases holding
that an accumulation which is not to exceed the permissible period
under the rule against perpetuities is valid,71 but no case at com-
mon law has set a period beyond which a direction to accumulate
is invalid. Where a court, in a jurisdiction lacking a statute
restraining the right to accumulate, wishes to place a restraint on
the right, in a case in which the estate is bound to vest within the
period allowed under the rule against' perpetuities, but which
directs an accumulation beyond this period, it is submitted that
the sound rule is to limit the right to the permissible period under
the rule against perpetuities.7 2  The following alternatives are
open to a court:
(I) It may declare the whole direction invalid under the
rule against perpetuities; because, although there is no restraint
on the power to alienate' or the fact of alienability, the income is
tied up for a longer period than is permitted by the rule, and the
direction to accumulate is a condition precedent to the gift over.
An argument against this construction is that it is a distortion of
the rule which is, after all, concerned with the vesting of estates
6 See supra note 55 for references to the New York law.
It was held in Campbell v. Weakley, 121 Ala. 64, 25 So. 694 (i898) that
an agreement to accumulate for a longer period than ten years is void ab iitio.
7O See appendix for a chart showing the law of accumulations in the various
states.
' See cases cited supra note 61.
Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 5o At. 898 (i9o) has sometimes been
cited for this proposition, but the case is not in point. That case involves a
trust with a direction to accumulate for thirty years. The court said the direc-
tion violated the rule against perpetuities, and therefore declared the whole
invalid.
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and the probability of their alienation, and not with the tying up
of income. A possible answer to this is that the vesting of prop-
erty without its fruits gives the person in whom it is vested an
emasculated estate; and the vesting of a bare estate without its
profits is so negligible as to contravene the spirit, if not the letter,
of the rule. Construction (i), however, would entirely defeat
the creator's intention, and courts tend to uphold trusts as much
as possible.
(2) It may cut the accumulation down to the permissible
period of the rule against perpetuities and sustain the rest, thus
doing at common law what other jurisdictions have accomplished
by statutory enactment.
(3) It may apply some arbitrary period, other than that of
the rule against perpetuities, as a yardstick for measuring the
valid limitation of an accumulation.
(4) It may apply no period at all, and thereby place no
judicial restrictions whatsoever on accumulations.
The question whether a funded insurance trust is an accu-
mulation, within the meaning of the rules and statutes relating
thereto, is of importance in only a few states. The policy will
generally be on the life of the settlor; and therefore the accumu-
lation will be limited to last not longer than the period permitted
under the rule against perpetuities or under the Thellusson Act.
Only in those states in which settlements of property which involve
an accumulation of the income may not last longer than the minor-
ity of the person benefited does the problem become acute. As
has been indicated, these states are Alabama, Arizona, California,
Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. New York has solved
the problem by a statutory declaration in its Personal Property
Law that such trusts do not involve an accumulation. It is still
a question whether the statute applies to trusts of realty.
This question is not entirely a new one in the courts, for it
has been litigated three times in England, once in Scotland, and
once in New York. Each of these cases, however, involves a
testamentary direction by a testator to purchase insurance with
the income of his estate, rather than a direction by a living settlor
SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS 365
to use the income of a given fund to purchase insurance. The
same arguments are applicable, however, to funded insurance
trusts as to the testamentary directions in the cases which we
are about to consider. Bassil v. Lister 73 was a case in which a
testator directed his executors to pay, out of the income of his
property, the premiums on policies of insurance on the lives of
two of his sons. The question was whether this direction was
valid or whether it was an accumulation within the meaning of
the Thelluson Act, and therefore only valid for a period of twenty-
one years. The court held the direction not to be an accumulation.
The reasons assigned by the court for reaching this result were:
(i) That the Thellusson Act was aimed against the accumu-
lation of rents and profits as such 74 (i. e., by the addition of the
income directly to the corpus), and not to an accumulation which
is incidental to the real purpose of the trust, the purchase of
insurance.
4 (2) That the resulting accumulations cannot be traced to any
particular premiums, 75 the whole fund being productively em-
ployed by the insurance company.
(3) That what the estate would receive back was not the
accumulation of the income, but the realization of a contract right.
Other arguments which have subsequently been made in
support of this result have been:
(4) That "the proceeds of the policy may well go to persons
other than the ultimate beneficiaries of the trust", there being no
augmentation of the corpus.
(5) That the policy is merely a device for preserving the
property, and not for increasing it.
76
(6) That insurance policies are a necessity, and that there
is therefore no deprivation of present enjoyment.
7
(7) That the letter of the statutes has not always been fol-
lowed, and insurance trusts are sufficiently desirable to warrant
another exception to the statute.
Supra note 2.
' Ibid. 182, 183.
"Ibid. 183.
(i923) 37 TRUST COMPANIES 695.
7 In re Hartman's Estate, supra note 9.
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The first argument, that it is not an accumulation of income
as such, opens the question how the Thellusson Act should be
construed. Since it is a restriction on the common law, must it be
strictly construed? Vice-Chancellor Sir J. G. Turner, in Bassil v.
Lister, would have limited it to its facts. But the application of
the statute has not been limited to the facts of the case which
precipitated its passage ;7S its terms are general and comprehen-
sive, and its application has been wide. Any case which fits the
description of an accumulation should be governed by the restric-
tions prescribed in the statute. Unless, then, we can find some-
thing economically or socially distinguishable between insurance
trusts and ordinary directions to accumulate, we are forced to
apply the statute.
The second argument, that there is no hoarding of the income
and that it is impossible to trace the accumulations from any
particular premium, could have been made in favor of the direction
in Thellusson v. Woodford,7 9 yet that is the very case which pre-
cipitated the passage of the Thellusson Act. Peter Isaac Thel-
lusson did not direct that the income from the corpus of his estate
should be earmarked and kept separate, in a vault, for the ultimate
beneficiaries; he directed that the income should be reinvested in
other real estate, which is undeniably similar to the purpose to
which the premiums in the hands of the insurance company are
put. Furthermore, insurance policies had no cash surrender value
at the time of the Bassil v. Lister litigation, but today, with the
exception of term insurance, they have such a cash value. Hence,
with each succeeding payment to the insurance company, we are
able to trace the result of the accumulation.
The third argument was also assigued as the basis of the
decision in Cathcart's Trustees v. Heneage's Trustees,"0 where the
testatrix empowered her trustees "if they saw cause, to make in-
surance on the life of her nephew", and to pay the premiums out
of the income of the testatrix's estate. They paid premiums for
more than thirty-seven years, the sum realized on the policy being
' For a good account of the act's early treatment by the courts, see HAR-
CRAVE, op. cit. supra note 63.
, Supra note 6I.
0 IO Sess. Cas. 1205 (Scot. 1883).
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less than the premiums paid. It was held that there was no accu-
mulation in that case. The court argued that the proceeds which
fall to the estate "do not arise out of accumulation, but out of
contract", and because of this fact the device was not invalid.
Admitting that this is true, what difference should it make? In-
direct accumulations are no more to be countenanced than direct
ones."' There is here an augmentation of the corpus and that
spells out an accumulation within the technical meaning of the
word.
8 2
The fourth argument, basing the validity of the device on
the fact that the accumulated income may go to someone other
than the recipient of the corpus, is invalidated by Matter of
Sands,83 where the testator provided that his business should be
continued and the profits thereof paid to his executors until the
majority of his youngest child, the segregated profits then to be
divided among his wife and children, the "fee" of the business
passing to his residuary estate. The court unhesitatingly called
this an invalid accumulation, irrespective of the fact that the "fee"
of the business was not augmented by the accumulation of income
in the hands of the executors for persons other than his residuary
legatees; saying that, since it was an accumulation which was not
wholly for the benefit of minors, it was invalid. The fact that
the amount realized was less than the sum of the premiums paid
out probably influenced the court in Cathcart's Trustees v.
Henea.qe's Trustees, although it seems logically irrelevant.
The fifth argument is based on cases in which the income was
used to keep the corpus from depreciating in value. In Re Gard-
iner 84 the testator directed that a yearly sum be set aside, out of
leaseholds which had thirty-three years to run from the date of the
testator's death, to pay the premiums on a policy of insurance to
See Penniman v. Howard, 71 Misc. 598, 128 N. Y. Supp. gio (911) ;
Thorn v. De Breteuil, supra note 57, where the court speaks of contravening
the "letter or spirit of the statute". The same attitude is seen in the "implied
direction to accumulate cases"; see, for instance, In re Neel's Estate, 252 Pa.
394, 97 Atl. 502 (ig6).
' Cf. Hascall v. King, supra note 59.
i Con. 259, 3 N. Y. Supp. 67 (1889).
[IgOI l I Ch. 697.
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secure the replacement, at the end of the term, of the capital that
would be lost through the expiration of the leaseholds. This was
held not to be an invalid direction to accumulate. While the prin-
ciple that the income of property may be used to preserve the
property is unquestioned,8 it is not applicable to this case. The
cases invoking the principle are cases in which there was an
unquestionably valid direction of income, the expenditures for
preservation being merely incidental thereto, whereas in our case
the entire expenditure is for preservation. Furthermore, in these
cases the expenditures were necessary, all other things being equal,
to make the corpus of approximately the same value when it
finally vested as it was at the creation of the trust; but in the case
under discussion, far from preserving, it is being used as a means
of creating an estate-augmenting the principal.
The sixth argument was made in the New York case of In re
Hartm an's Estate,"6 where a testator created a trust, directing his
executors to set aside an annuity sufficient to pay the premiums
on a policy insuring the life of his son-in-law. The question was
whether such a trust was void as creating an accumulation within
the meaning of the New York statute, and the court held that it
was not an invalid accumulation. Surrogate O'Brien, in attempt-
ing to show that there was no deprivation of present enjoyment of
the net income, said:
"So far as present enjoyment of the fund is concerned,
the present benefit includes, with all those who in one way or
another participate, the beneficiary of the insurance, testator's
daughter. Life insurance has come to be a vital factor in the
life of our people. The present comfort, solace and protec-
tion of an insurance policy in the household is properly placed
close to, if not among, the necessaries of life, and is secured
with a sense of satisfaction and of duty fulfilled by the many
as they would make sure of the coats on their dependents'
backs or the roofs over their heads. What a source of pres-
ent comfort this insurance is here to one who has been cut off
in every other respect from participation in her father's sub-
stantial estate! Viewed in a practical light, this insurance
Vine v. Raleigh, [18911 2 Ch. 13; In re Nesmith, 14o N. Y. 609, 35 N. E.
942 (1894) ; In re Hurlbatt, [i91o] 2 Ch. 553.
'Supra note 9.
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means just so much of the expenses of the household of the
insured and beneficiary covered, as they might -themselves
otherwise expend on insurance." 87
The most patent argument against the learned surrogate's
position is that "present comfort, solace, and protection" is not
money. The test which he is attempting to satisfy is whether or
not there is a deprivation of enjoyment of income, and by that is
meant a deprivation of cash. Furthermore, the statement that
insurance (particularly life insurance, with which we are mainly
concerned) is "properly placed close to, if not among, the neces-
saries of life" is open to grave doubts. This, coupled with the
fact that the settlor's direction to purchase insurance results in an
augmentation of the corpus, renders the argument open to serious
attack.
The surrogate's argument would seem to apply just as well
to the case of a savings account into which the settlor ordered his
trustee to put some of the income; for savings are almost as much
a necessity, and serve almost the same purposes, as insurance.88
The last argument, and the one which is probably the strong-
est, is that, since the letter of the statutes against accumulations
has not always been followed, and since funded insurance trusts
seem so desirable socially, they should constitute another exception
to the statutes. New York has accomplished this result by statute.
For instance, accumulations resulting from an unforeseeable
inability to devote the entire income to an otherwise valid use
directed by the settlor have been held valid on the ground that
6Ibid. 866, 215 N. Y. Supp. at 8o6.
1sThis reasoning of Surrogate O'Brien may lead to undesirable, if not
unsound, results. Thus in In re Hartman's Estate, 135 Misc. 428, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 672 (i929) it was decided that the testator's son-in-law, whose life was
insured under the terms of the Hartman will, should be charged with the
transfer tax on the annuity necessary annually to pay the premiums, since he
was the insured and received the benefits of the provision in the will. One can
imagine the alleged enjoyer pawning his possessions to pay the transfer tax on
a benefit which will some day accrue to persons other than himself. It is sub-
mitted the learned surrogate would not have been adopting a position incon-
sistent with that taken by him on the accumulations point, had he taxed the
transfer to the trustee rather than the insured. One's inclination is to say that
the beneficiaries of the proceeds of the policy should pay the tax; the strongest
legal position, so far as consistency is concerned, would be to tax the trustee;
to tax the insured seems surprising. Cf. In re Haedrich's Estate, 236 N. Y.
Supp. 395 (1929).
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they are purely accidental;8' and, similarly, a direction to keep
the property in repair in order to prevent its depreciation in value
has been upheld on the ground that new rights, privileges, or
immunities are not being created, when in fact they are.90 Since
this is true, and since every court that has passed on the validity
of a testamentary direction to purchase insurance with the income
of an estate " has evidenced its desire to uphold the validity of
a direction to purchase insurance, by holding that it does not con-
template an invalid accumulation, despite able argument by counsel
and text writers 92 for the opposite view, we may expect courts to
continue deciding the same way. The difficulty with this argu-
ment is that the cases are old, and, with the exception of In re
Hartman's Estate and Cathcart's Trustees v. Heneage's Trustees,
are English cases. It may well be that the English cases have
established the law there, but they would only be persuasive author-
ity, at best, in an American jurisdiction. This lack of -American
authority, coupled with the fact that the soundness of the decided
cases is highly questionable, does not lend much comfort, by way
of predictability, to the creator of an insurance trust.
The Thellusson Act provides that "the Rents, Issues, Profits,
and Produce of such Property so directed to be accumulated, shall,
so long as the same shall be directed to be accumulated contrary
to the Provisions of this Act, go to and be received by such Person
or Persons as would have been entitled thereto if such Accumula-
tion had not been directed". 93  There was a tendency on the part
of the English courts in the early cases to argue that the accumu-
lation is a condition precedent to the gift over of the corpus and
therefore the trust is entirely invalid, since the settlor has said that
the gift shall vest at too remote a time, and the court cannot sub-
' Eberley's Appeal, i io Pa. 95, I Atl. 330 (1895); In re Kohler, 193 App.
Div. 8, 183 N. Y. Supp. 550 (1920).
For example, see Vine v. Raleigh, supra note 85, where income was ex-
pended to improve the condition of buildings, thus keeping them "in good,
habitable repair", and In re Nesmith, supra note 85, where income was used to
build a shed at a cost of $i2,ooo.
'In re Vaughn, i8 W. N. 89 (Eng. 1883) was a case in which a testator
created a trust to pay premiums on a policy insuring the lives of his sons, and
the court held that this was not an invalid direction to accumulate.
9I JARMAN, WILLS (4th ed. 1881) 316, 317, (6th ed. 191o) 391 et seq.
'Supra note 6o.
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stitute a shorter time.94  But courts have always tended to uphold
trusts as much as possible and construe limitations as vested.
These facts, in addition to the words of the act, have resulted in
the determination, in the more recent cases, that only the period
of invalid accumulation is bad, and the released income thus goes
to the settlor or his estate (heirs, next of kin, or residuary lega-
tees) until the time when the invalid accumulation was to end.95
In a jurisdiction having a statute restraining the right to
accumulate, where there is a direction that the released income
shall go to the "presumptive holder of the next eventual estate",96
the released income goes to the donee of the corpus.
9 
T
Typical of such statutes is that of California,"8 which reads
as follows:
"When, in consequence of a valid limitation of a future
interest, there is a suspension of the power of alienation, or
of the ownership during the continuation of which the income
is undisposed of, and no valid direction for its accumulation
is given, such income belongs to the persons presumptively
entitled to the next eventual interest."
It should be noted that in order for the statute to apply there
must be (i) a suspension of the power of alienation or of the
ownership and (2) a person presumptively entitled to the next
eventual interest. If either of these is lacking, the statute does
not apply, and the released income passes by intestacy.99
" Vawdry v. Geddes, I Russ. & M. 203 (Eng. 1830); Curtis v. Lukin, 5
Beav. 147 (Eng. 1842); Scarisbrick v. Skelmersdale, 17 Sim. 187 (Eng. 1850).
Oddie v. Brown, 4 De G. F. & J. 179 (Eng. 1859) ; In re Wood [19o4]
2 Ch. 4.
' This applies to all American jurisdictions which have enacted statutes
with reference to invalid accumulations, with the exception of Illinois and
Pennsylvania, which follow England, and Alabama, Arizona and Indiana, which
have no provision directing the fate of the released income. See appendix.
The provision concerning the presumptive holder of the next eventual es-
tate, though found in Section 63 of the N. Y. Real Property Law, has been ap-
plied to income from personalty as well. In re Harteau, 2o4 N. Y. 292, 97 N. E.
726 (1912). But in Michigan and Minnesota, where the statutes restraining
the right to accumulate only affect the right to accumulate income from realty,
and not personalty, the "presumptive holder of the next estate" provisions
have been held inapplicable to the income earned by personalty. Toms v.
Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N. W. 814 (1879) ; Congdon v. Congdon, I6o Minn.
343, 2oo N. IV. 76 (1924).
CA. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 733.
"U. S. Trust Co. v. Soher, 178 N. Y. 442, 7o N. E. 970 (1904).
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There has always been a tendency on the part of the courts
to sustain as much of a trust as is valid, deleting only the invalid
portions. This has been done, without exception, in hundreds of
cases involving testamentary trusts, the gift over being upheld
when there was an invalid direction to accumulate income. But,
in the only cases of living trusts which can be found in the reports,
in which there is an invalid direction to accumulate income with
a valid gift over, the courts have declared the whole trust invalid.
Thus Mann-Vynne v. Equitable Trust Company 100 was a case in
which the settlor directed that the trustee set aside enough of the
rents and profits each year to amortize a mortgage plus interest,
to pay off a note, and to pay what remained to the settlor; the
court, on the basis of the invalid direction to accumulate, declared
the whole trust void, despite the fact that the gift over was per-
fectly valid. Herzig v. Herzig ""o was a similar case of a living
trust in which the court reached the same conclusion.
Although the words of the statute would seem to apply with
equal force to living trusts and to testamentary trusts, there is a
strong argument in favor of refusing to apply it to the former.
In the case of a testamentary trust the testator, having made an
invalid disposition of the income, cannot redispose of it, since he
is dead. Rather than declare the whole trust invalid, the court
upholds as much thereof as is possible. On the other hand, where
the creator of the trust is still alive, the court prefers to return the
corpus and permit him to redispose of it in its entirety, rather than
to apply an arbitrary rule as to the income thereof. Furthermore,
it is submitted that the principle invoked by the courts in declaring
the whole disposition invalid in the case of living trusts-namely,
its inability to separate the valid provisions from the invalid-are
peculiarly applicable to the typical funded insurance trust. The
settlor's primary intention in creating an insurance trust is to pro-
vide income with which to pay premiums on life insurance and the
gift over on the death of the insured is only of secondary impor-
tance. Having failed to provide a valid means of paying these
premiums, the entire trust should fall, rather than confer a bene-
'®2oI App. Div. 149, 194 N. Y. Supp. 5o (1922).
" 14o App. Div. 514, 125 N. Y. Supp. 402 (91o).
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fit, not only with the corpus but with the income as well, upon
those whose bounty is secondary.
In Alabama, Arizona and Indiana, where there are statutes
restraining the right to accumulate, but no statutory direction of
the released income, it passes to the settlor. If the latter is dead,
the income from realty passes to his heirs and the income from
personalty goes to his next of kin. If there is a residuary clause
in the settlor's will, the residuary legatees are entitled to the
income.'
o2
TAX ASPECTS OF INSURANCE TRUSTS: THE TAXATION OF THE
PROCEEDS OF INSURANCE POLICIES UNDER FEDERAL
AND STATE INHERITANCE TAXES
The Federal Estate Tax,'0 3 like all inheritance taxes, rests on
"But cf. Campbell v. Weakley, supra note 69.
"The relevant provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 69, 26
U. S. C. § io9i et seq. (Supp. 1928) (unrepealed by the Revenue Act of
1928) are as follows:
"SEc. 301 (a) In lieu of the tax imposed by Title III of the Revenue Act of
1924, a tax equal to the sum of the following percentages of the value of
the net estate (determined as provided in section 303) is hereby imposed
upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent dying after the
enactment of this act, whether a resident or nonresident of the United
States;
i per centum of the amount of the net estate not in excess of $5o,ooo;
(graduated rates follow, reaching 20 per centum of the amount by which
the net estate exceeds $io,oooooo)
"SEC. 302. The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or
personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated- . . .
(c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,
except in case of a bona fide sale . . . Where within two years prior
to his death . . . and without such a consideration the decedent has
made a transfer . . . of any of his property . . and the value
. . . of the property . . . transferred to any one person is in excess
of $5000, then, to the extent of such excess, such transfer . . . shall
be deemed and held to have been made in contemplation of death . . .
(d) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment
thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the
exercise of a power, either by the decedent alone or in conjunction with
any person, to alter, amend, or revoke, or where the decedent relinquished
any such power in contemplation of his death, except in case of a bona fide
sale . . .
(g) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insur-
ance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to
the extent of the excess over $4oooo of the amount receivable by all other
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"the principle that death is the generating source from which the
particular taxing power takes its being".
04
The peculiar feature of the tax is that it is measured by the
net estate of the decedent (after an $ioo,ooo exemption) and, in
the absence of express provision in the will, 10 5 the entire burden
falls on the residuary legatee. 10 The tax is, therefore, usually
described as a tax "not (on) the interest to which some person
succeeds on a death, but the interest which ceased by reason of
the death",'10 7 as opposed to state transfer taxes, which are gen-
erally described as taxes on the right of the beneficiary to take
property on the death of another,lOs since they are measured by
beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon
his own life .
"SEc. 303. For the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate shall be
determined-
(a) In the case of a resident, by deducting from the value of the
gross estate ....
(4) An exemption of $ioo,ooo.
"SEc. 314. (b) . . . If any part of the gross estate consists of proceeds
of policies of insurance upon the life of the decedent receivable by a bene-
ficiary other than the executor, the executor shall be entitled to recover
from such beneficiary such portion of the total tax paid as the proceeds,
in excess of $4oooo, of sLch policies bear to the net estate. If there is
more than one such beneficiary the executor shall be entitled to recover
from such beneficiaries in the same ratio."
Section 315 makes the tax a lien for ten years upon all property included
in the gross estate. If the tax is not paid, any beneficiary or legatee can be
held liable. Section 314 gives one who has paid more than he should a cross-
action against those equally, or more immediately, liable.
Section 303 (e) : "The amount receivable as insurance upon the life of a
nonresident . . . shall not, for the purpose of this title, be deemed property
within the United States."
U. S. Treas. Reg. 7o, art. 25: "The term 'insurance' refers to Mfe insur-
ance of every description, including death benefits paid by fraternal beneficial
societies, operating under the lodge system."
101 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 56, 2o Sup. Ct. 747, 753 (I9OO).
Brown's Estate v. Hoge, i98 Iowa 373, i99 N. W. 320 (1924) ; Matter
of Oakes, 248 N. Y. 280, 162 N. E. 79 (1928).
" The burden falls in general wherever the state law puts it. Edwards v.
Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 44 Sup. Ct 293 (1924). As a rule this means that it falls
on the residuary legatee. Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471,
124 N. E. 265 (I919); Thompson v. Union & Merc. Trust Co., 164 Ark. 411,
262 S. W. 324 (1924) ; Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 291
(924) ; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y. 488, i44 N. E.
769 (924), certiorari denied in 266 U. S. 633, 45 Sup. Ct. 225 (1925). Contra:
Fuller v. Gale, 78 N. H. 544, 103 Atl. 3o8 (1918) (apportioning tax among all
legatees).
"' Edwards v. Slocum, supra note 124, at 63, 44 Sup. Ct. at 293; cf. Suc-
cession o~f Gheens, 148 La. 1017, 88 So. 253 (1921).
0 Magoun v. Illinois Trust Co., 170 U. S. 283, 288. i8 Sup. Ct. 594 (1898).
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the size of the share taken by each beneficiary, and each one pays
a tax on his own share.10 9 Thus an estate of $i,ooo,ooo divided
equally among ten beneficiaries will be taxed by the federal govern-
ment as an estate of $i,ooo,ooo, and not as ten estates of $ioo,ooo
each; while the state will tax it as the latter. The federal estate
tax on a net estate of $ioo,ooo is $1,500. On a net estate of
$i,ooo,ooo the tax is $48,500, over thirty times as much.
If the gross estate is less than $ioo,ooo, there will be no
federal estate tax. The tax is determined on the basis of the net
estate, which is the gross estate less certain specified deductions,
including a $ioo,ooo exemption in the case of residents of the
United States.
It should be noted that the insurance provisions of the act
only apply to policies taken out on the decedent's life. Hence, if
a man wishes to obtain the advantages of an investment trust and
effect a saving in taxes, he may do this by taking out a policy on
the life of his wife. If an unfunded trust is created with respect
to the proceeds of the policy, these proceeds will not be subject to
the estate tax as a part of the husband's estate, since they are not
proceeds of a policy covering the life of the decedent, and they
will not be subject to the tax as a part of the wife's estate, since
she did not pay the premiums either directly or indirectly 1"o and
accordingly cannot be held to have taken out the policy.
The statute expressly taxes policies payable to one's estate or
to one's executor, where they were taken out by the insured."'
This branch of the statute also covers insurance payable to a trus-
tee for the purpose of paying death taxes and administration
expenses, so that there is no $40,0o0 exemption on such policis.
The Treasury regulations provide that:
"It includes insurance taken out to provide funds to
meet the estate tax and any other taxes or charges which are
enforceable against the estate. The manner in which the
"'See, for example, N. Y. TAx LAW (1928) art. 10, § 220 et seq., N. Y.
CoNs. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1928) 997.
'IOU. S. Treas. Reg. 70, art. 25.
raIn Mimnaugh v. U. S., 66 Ct. Cl. 411 (1928) the 1918 tax (not expressly
retroactive) was held applicable to policies taken out before 1918, payable to
the insured's estate.
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policy is drawn is immaterial so long as there is an obligation,
legally binding upon the beneficiary, to use the proceeds in
payment of such taxes or charges." 112
As to policies payable to third parties, the statute 113 is clear
on its face. It taxes all policies in excess of $40,000 taken out
by the decedent on his own life. The only possible question is
as to the constitutionality of the tax. It was held constitutional
as to policies in which the insured retained a power to change the
beneficiary, in Chase National Bank v. United States."4  This
case settles finally the ordinary case of an insurance policy, since
policies are generally revocable.
However, in a funded insurance trust it would not be sur-
prising to have both the trust and the policy irrevocable;115 and
the ordinary rights and privileges (borrowing, surrendering, en-
dowment rights, dividends, etc.) may be given to the trustees or
to the beneficiary." 6  The taxation of irrevocable policies- is,
therefore, of some importance, especially if the conclusion is that
they are not taxable. Let us consider the taxability of irrevocable
policies, first per se and then as part of an insurance trust.
The argument against the validity of a tax on an irrevocable
policy is based on two grounds: That the tax is a direct tax and
unconstitutional because unapportioned, in violation of the Con-
stitution;"' or that the tax is so arbitrary and capricious as to
violate the Fifth Amendment (the due process clause).
The first argument is substantially as follows."1 8 It is first
urged that-the very nature of the insurance agreement makes the
" Supra note IiO, art. 26.
"' Supra note 103, § 302 (g).
11278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 120 (1929). Policies taken out in 1922, pay-
able to the insured's wife and reserving a power to change the beneficiary, were
held taxable under the Revenue Act of i92I.
' The term "irrevocable" will be used as a shorthand expression for the
absence of a reservation of the power to change beneficiaries in policies.
. Where the policy is revocable, but the trust is not, a peculiar problem
arises as to which, if either, is to govern. Staples v. Murray, 124 Kan. 73o,
262 Pac. 558 (1928).
' U. S. CONSTITUTION, ART. I, § 9, CL 4.
118Frick & Lewellyn, 298 Fed. 803 (W. D. Pa. 1924) (holding the tax
invalid as to revocable and irrevocable policies), aff'd on different grounds in
268 U. S. 238, 45 Sup. Ct. 487 (1925).
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tax invalid. The insured disposes of no property in the sense of
testamentary or inter vivos gifts. He merely contracts with the
insurance company that in return for the payment of periodical
sums the company will pay, on his death, a definite sum to a des-
ignated beneficiary. The beneficiary's interest in the contract
vests immediately. There is no taxable transfer of property at
the time of death, as there is in the case of the revocable policy
where it is the termination of the power of revocation that is
taxed."n  The tax, therefore, is either imposed on the beneficiary
because he is the owner of the proceeds or the chose in action, or
it is a tax on the right to give property inter vivos. In either case
it is a direct tax.
The second argument is based on the due process clause. It
is argued that the estate tax, as a tax which the executor must
pay,'20 is unreasonable, since the proceeds of policies which are
taxed belong to the beneficiary and not to the insured.' 2 ' The
right of reimbursement 122 is surely not an adequate safeguard,
for the beneficiary may be insolvent.12 3  As a tax on the bene-
ficiary it is bad, because lie pays a rate based on the size of the
testator's estate. 124  This is unreasonable, because the proceeds
are not in any way the decedent's.' 25  The tax is likewise an
unfair discrimination against the beneficiary of a policy on the
life of one leaving a large estate. Two beneficiaries, receiving
$I4O,OOO each, might pay a greatly different tax. If the insured
left a net estate of $19,000,000, the beneficiary would pay a tax
of approximately $IO,000; whereas if the insured left no other
2"i Stone, J., in Chase National Bank v. U. S., supra note 114 at 338, 49
Sup. Ct. at 129.
'Supra note 103, § 305 (a).
"It may be doubted by some, aside from express constitutional restric-
tions, whether the taxation by Congress of the property of one person, accom-
panied with an arbitrary provision that the rate of tax shall be fixed with
reference to the sum of the property of another . . . would not transcend
the limitations arising from those fundamental conceptions of free government
which underlie all constitutional systems." Knowlton v. Moore, supra note 104,
at 77, 20 Sup. Ct. at 762.
'Supra note ia, § 314 (b).
'Furthermore, including the policies in the estate may make higher
brackets applicable, and so raise the tax on the entire estate.
" Supra note 121.
I See the discussion as to the directness of the tax, supra p. 376 et seq.
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property the beneficiary would be free from taxation altogether.' 20
The answer to the first argument would seem to be that life
insurance is a form of property like a savings bank deposit, being
traceable to the premiums, and not a bare contract right;' 27 and
that the vested character of a gift does not necessarily defeat the
estate tax.128  Many gifts have been held taxable under the estate
tax as gifts to take effect at death, where the interests of the bene-
ficiaries were vested inter vivos. Where S conveys to T in trust
for S for life, remainder to X, the trust has been taxed.129 Only
three types of taxes have ever been called direct by the Supreme
Court; poll taxes, income taxes, and property taxes, which, in
form, tax a res.130
It would seem that, in the absence of a binding and rigid test
as to what constitutes a direct tax, the tax on policies should, and
will, be held valid. The fact that the proceeds are the offspring
of the premiums would make the tax on the proceeds, if not an
excise on the transfer at death, an excise on the privilege of
making the inter vivos gift.'
3 l
'$4o,ooo deduction on the policies; $iooooo exemption on all estates.
Supra note 103, §§ 303, 314 (b).
' Chase National Bank v. U. S., supra note 114, at 337, 49 Sup. Ct. at 128.
"Obviously, the word 'transfer' in the statute, or the privilege which may con-
stitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in such a restricted sense as to refer
only to the passing of particular items of property directly from the decedent
to the transferee. It must, we think, at least include the transfer of property
procured through expenditures by the decedent with the purpose, effected at
his death, of having it pass to another. . . . It is of some significance also
that by the local law applicable to the insurer and the insured in this case, a
beneficiary's rights in the policy and its proceeds are deemed to be the proceeds
of the premiums expended by the insured and as such recoverable in full by
one having an equitable claim attaching to the premiums. Holmes v. Gilman,
138 N. Y. 369."
' Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 271, 48 Sup. Ct. 225, 227 (928).
' Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Tait, 295 Fed. 429 (D. C. Md. 1923);
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Routzahn, 7 F. (2d) 483 (N. D. Ohio 1925), reV'd on
different grounds in 22 F. (2d) IOO9 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; McCaughn v. Girard
Trust Co., ii F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926); May v. Heiner, 25 F. (2d) 1004
(W. D. Pa. 1928); Nichols v. Bradley, 27 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. ist, 1928).
Contra: Miller v. U. S., 62 Ct. Cl. 404 (1926); Arnold v. U. S., 62 Ct. Cl. 439
(1926) ; Frew v. Bowers, 12 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), dismissed, 275
U. S. 578, 48 Sup. Ct. 22 (1927) ; Carnill v. McCaughn, 3o F. (2d) 696 (E. D.
Pa. 1929).
I0 Note (1926) 26 Co. L. REv. 852.
:"The gift tax, now repealed, was held constitutional in Bromley v. Mc-
Caughn, 26 F. (2d) 38o (E. D. Pa. 1928). In Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S.
142, 276 U. S. 594, 48 Sup. Ct. lO5 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) and Untermeyer v.
Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) the gift tax was
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The second argument would seem to be just as applicable to
the case of a revocable policy, yet the tax as applied to such policies
was expressly held constitutional in Chase National Bank v.
United States.132  The general counsel of the Internal Revenue
Department has expressly ruled that insurance policies, though
assigned in contemplation of, or to take effect on, death, do not
fall within Section 302 (c), 133 the section taxing such gifts.
A. State Estate Taxes
The Revenue Act of 1926 provides:
"The tax imposed by this section shall be credited with
the amount of any estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession
taxes actually paid to any State or Territory of the District
of Columbia, in respect of any property included in the gross-
estate. The credit allowed by this subdivision shall not
exceed 8o% of the tax imposed by this section, and shall
include only such taxes as were actually paid and credit there-
for claimed within three years after the filing of the return
required by Section 304." 134
This section allows the estate of a decedent to deduct all state
inheritance taxes up to 8o per cent of the tax imposed by the rates
in Section 301 (a). The result of this provision was the enact-
ment of state estate taxes designed expressly to cover this slack.
Sixteen states have enacted such estate taxes.' 3 5 Some, like New
held unconstitutional only as to retroactivity-there was no doubt expressed in
the opinions as to its general validity. The Supreme Court, in Bromley v.
McCaughn, decided Nov. 25, 1929, held the gift tax constitutional.
'Stpra note 114.
'VI-I Cum. Bull. 3118.
' Section 3O (b)Xsupta bte. 122.
In Montana and Colorado-"Hie tax applies only to estates over $i,ooo,ooo;
in Rhode Island, $25o,oo;-in,New York, $200,000, or where the estate exceeds
$ioo,ooo and includes property transferred contingently, etc. N. Y. Laws igog,
c. 62, § 249a.
In Mississippi and Tennessee policies over $2o,ooo are included.
In Colorado, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia the tax is ex-
pressly to be Lorne by all legatees and beneficiaries proportionately. Only in
New York is the tax on policies expressly made payable by the beneficiaries.
In Mississippi and Georgia the estate tax is the only inheritance tax.
In Hagood v. Doughton, 195 N. C. 811, 143 S. E. 841 (1928) the North
Carolina estate tax was construed as being independent of any state inheritance
taxes; its reference to the federal tax being merely for the purpose of specify-
ing rates, etc. This would seem to make the North Carolina tax, at any rate,
independent of the existence of the Federal Estate Tax.
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York,'13  have enacted miniature replicas of the federal act, with a
rate schedule four-fifths of the federal rates and a provision for
crediting other state inheritance taxes. Others, like California, 37
take up the slack expressly in general terms. The federal rulings
will no doubt be followed in all these states.
138
B. State Transfer Ta.xes
The state transfer taxes are generally considered as in their
nature different from the estate tax.130 However, except for the
method of computation and the difference in the person who bears
the burden of the tax in the absence of express provision in the
will, 140 there is no real distinction. As was well said by Van
Devanter, J., in Frick v. Pennsylvania :141 "While the Federal tax
is called an estate tax, and the state tax is called a transfer tax,
both are imposed as excises on the transfer of property from a
decedent and both take effect at the instant of the transfer." 143
In North Dakota and Oregon the state tax is called an estate tax, but it
is borne proportionately by all the legatees and is not designed to take up the
slack in the federal act. Oregon has also a transfer tax based on the size of
the shares of the legatees, and imposed on them individually.
IN. Y. Laws 19og, Art. lob.
'CAL CODES & GEN. LAWS, (Supp. 1927) tit. 591, act 8443, § 2Y.
I See VA. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1926) 26o.
'Supra notes I07, io8, I09.
"o For the estate tax see supra note io6. But cf. supra note 135 as to some
state estate taxes, and supra note 103, § 314 (b) as to the burden on the bene-
ficiaries of the policies. The state transfer taxes fall -on various legatees and
beneficiaries according to the size of their gifts and their relationship to the
decedent. But, of course, all the taxes may be made payable out of one par-
ticular part of a decedent's estate. See 5i A. L. R. 454 (927).
241 268 U. S. 473, 498, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 6o8 (1925).
' That the transfer tax is not so inherently a different kind of tax from
the estate tax may be seen from the following decisions: United States v.
Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1073 (895), where a transfer tax on a
gift to the United States was held valid; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U. S. 345, 41 Sup. Ct. 5o6 (921), where a state transfer tax was held not
deductible from the net estate, in computing the federal estate tax; Stebbins
v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 45 Sup. Ct. 424 (1925), where a transfer tax imposed
on the net estate without deducting the federal estate tax was held valid; Keith
v. Johnson, 271 U. S. 1, 46 Sup. Ct. 415 (1926), where the New York transfer
tax was held deductible in computing the net income of the estate during the
period of administration.
And see Succession of Gheens, supra note IO7, which called the federal tax
a tax on those whom the law requires to bear the burden. of the tax, and so
held the estate tax not deductible in computing the net estate for the levying
of the state transfer tax. The states split as to this deductibility. 7 A. L. R.
714 (1920) ; I6 A. L. R. 674, 702 (922).
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It is the passing of wealth at death that is the real subject of the
tax. It is submitted that the same general considerations apply
to the transfer taxes as to the estate tax, with reference to the
taxing of insurance trusts.
C. Application to Proceeds of Policies
In only four states are insurance policies expressly taxable
under the transfer tax: Wisconsin,' 43 Arkansas, 144 Tennessee,143
and Montana. 146  Kentucky 147 expressly exempts policies payable
to designated beneficiaries; North Dakota 14S exempts policies in
general.
The only case found adjudicating any of these taxes is In re
Allis' Will,149 which held the Wisconsin tax constitutional as
applied to irrevocable policies taken out prior to the passage of the
tax, payable to the insured's widow, where, according to the law,
the policies would revest in the insured, should the widow die
first.150
The arguments against the validity of these transfer taxes
are substantially the same as those against the validity of the fed-
eral tax.'' It is noteworthy that the only difference between the
state and federal taxes on policies, aside from possible administra-
tive variations, is that rates applicable in the former are not
dependent upon the size of the rest of the decedent's estate.
The great majority of the state transfer taxes are silent as to
policies; and, though the general tenor of authority is to the effect
"WIs. STAT. (927) § 72.01 (7): "Insurance payable upon the death of
any person shall be deemed a part of his estate for the purpose of the tax, and
shall be taxable to the person or persons entitled thereto."
1"AK. DIG. STAT. (Supp. 1927) § Io2i8 (4); only where payable to a
person other than ascendant, descendant, or spouse.
45 TENN. ANN. CODE (Supp. 1926) § 756a-I (3); like Arkansas, supra
note 92.
"- MONT. REv. CODES (Supp. 1927) § 10377.1 (7) ; where over $5oooo, and
"if payable to more than one person the said $50,000 shall be prorated between
such persons in proportion to the amount of insurance payable to each".
"'Ky. Acts 1924, c. III.
" N. D. Laws 1927, C. 267, § 2 (8).
140 I74 Wis. 527, 184 N. W. 381 (1921).
"According to the unique insurance law of Wisconsin, the insured-payer
can always change the beneficiary of a policy except where it is payable to his
widow, in which case it will revert to his estate if his widow should die first.
' Supra page 376 et seq.
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that policies payable to the insured's estate are taxable, 1 2 the cases
are practically unanimous in holding that policies are not gifts to
take effect on death.' 1 3  The general tenor of their arguments is
similar to that discussed above with reference to the constitutional-
ity of the Federal Estate Tax. Of course, the fact that here it is
a question of statutory construction as well as constitutionality
makes the arguments much more persuasive.
D. Taxation of the Securities of a Funded Trust Under
the Estate Tax
Where the trust is subject to a power of revocation in the
settlor, alone or in conjunction with a third party, the securities
on the settlor's death will be taxable under the express provisions
of Section 302 (d). Where it is revocable only with the consent
of the beneficiary, its taxability under this section is in doubt; it
will probably be treated as on a par with an irrevocable trust.'5 4
If the irrevocable trust be considered a trust for the benefit of the
settlor-insured for life (a trust to apply the income to his use by
paying his premiums), it would be taxable under Section 302 (c) .15.
If it be regarded as a trust to accumulate during the settlor's life
for the benefit of the beneficiary, it would seem similarly taxable,
though the few authorities on the point are unharmonious. 15c As
'" Matter of Knoedler, 14o N. Y. 377, 35 N. E. 6ol (893). But cf. North
Dakota, supra note 148.
' Irrevocable: In re Fay's Estate, 25 Misc. 468, 55 N. Y. Supp. 749 (x899)
semble (only power insured had was to allow lapse) ; In re Bullen's Estate,
143 Wis. 512, 128 N. W. IO9 (1910) (before present provisions), aff'd, on
collateral point, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1912). Though payable to
executor for insured's wife and children: In re Elting, 78 Misc. 692, 14o N. Y.
Supp. 238 (1912). Though policies would revert to insured if beneficiary died
first: In re Parsons, 117 App. Div. 321, 3O2 N. Y. Supp. 168 (1907).
'The reservation of the power to supervise investments, require trustees
to execute proxies, vote stock, control execution of leases, appoint successor
trustees, was held insufficient to take a trust out of the irrevocable class, in
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 SUp. Ct. 123 (1929).
' Supra note 129.
Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 7o, art. 18: "Where the decedent reserved only
a portion of the income, only a corresponding proportion of the value of the
property should be included in the gross estate, unless, however, the possession
or enjoyment of the remaining portion of the transferred property, or a part
thereof, was postponed until, at or after the decedent's death, in which case
there should also be included in the gross estate such remaining portion or part
thereof, as the case may be." But cf. McCormick v. Commissioner, 33 B. T.
A. 423 (1928).
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a trust to pay the premiums for the beneficiary, it would seem to
be non-taxable under Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company.
15 7
Where the trust produces more income than needed to pay the
premiums, the surplus may go (a) to the insured, in which case
the trust res would be taxable as to the amount over and above
that needed to produce an income sufficient to pay the pre-
miums ;-"" (b) to buy additional policies, in which case the entire
res would remain an entity; (c) to the beneficiary, in which case
the amount taxable in (a) would seem to be non-taxable under
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company. Since such trusts play an
integral part in the plans of settlors for the disposition of their
property after their death, it would seem that they should not
escape taxation.
The problems arising in the application of state transfer taxes
to the securities of a funded trust are similar to those under the
estate tax. Where the trust is irrevocable, it will be taxable if it
be regarded as a trust for the benefit of the settlor for life. 5 ' If
it be regarded as an accumulation, the same doubt arises.160 If it
be regarded as a trust for the benefit of the beneficiary forthwith,
the authorities are divided.16 1 Where the trust is revocable, it
is, without more, taxable in some states. 162  In the absence of
In Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 47 Sup. Ct. 461 (i927) S, with a life
expectancy of 16 years, conveyed to T to accumulate for his three children
until I95-thirty years later. S died a few months later. Held, not taxable
as a gift to take effect on death.
'Supra note 155.
- Cf. Tips v. Bass, 21 F. (2) 460 (W. D. Tex. 1927).
'Matter of Hartman, 126 Misc. 862, 215 N. Y. Supp. 8o2 (1926), aff'd
22o App. Div. 755, 222 N. Y. Supp. 817 (1927), in holding a funded trust on the
life of a third party not an accumulation, seems to have adopted this theory.
See also In re Hartman, supra note 88. See supra note IO7 as to taxability.
' Cf. People v. McCormich, 327 Ill. 547, i58 N. E. 86i (1927); Matter
of Kirby, 133 Misc. 152, 231 N. Y. Supp. 4o8 (1928).
11In re Cruger 54 App. Div. 405, 66 N. Y. Supp. 636 (i9oO), aff'd i66
N. Y. 6o2, 59 N. E. 1121 (i9oi) ; State St. Trust Co. v. Treasurer, 209 Mass.
373, 95 N. E. 85i (i911) (taxable). Contra: State v. Welch's Estate, 235
Mich. 555, 2o9 N. W. 930 (1926). In Matter of Dunlap, 205 App. Div. 128,
199 N. Y. Supp. 147 (1923) the trust was held taxable where the gift over was
to X or his issue, the court stressing the fact that by the terms of the trust
the property would revert to the settlor if X died without issue during the life
of the settlor. But on this point compare note 164.
IN. Y. TAx LAW (1928) § 220(2) expressly taxes transfers in which
there may be "any change in the use or enjoyment of property included in
such transfer, or the income thereof . . . in the lifetime of the grantor
. . by reason of any power reserved to or conferred upon the grantor
• either solely or in conjunction with any person or persons to alter, or
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statute, the authorities are divided. 163  Where the settlor retains
a right to the surplus income, a proportionate part of the corpus is
clearly taxable.'
64
E. Income Taxes 165
Federal Income Tax
The law here is comparatively well settled. During the con-
tinuance of the funded trust the income earned by the trust securi-
ties is taxable to the settlor, in so far as it may be used to pay
premiums on insurance on his life.' 6 If the surplus income, if
any, is, or may be, distributed to, or accumulated for, the benefit
of the settlor, in his discretion "alone or in conjunction with any
person not a beneficiary of the trust",1' 7 it is taxable to him; like-
wise, if the surplus income is payable to a third party, but the
trust is revocable.'0 8 Where the surplus income is to be paid to a
third party, it is taxable to him, whether it is paid over or not.'6 9
to amend, or to revoke any transfer, or any portion thereof, as to the portion
remaining at the time of the death of the grantor, vendor or donor, thus subject
to alteration, amendment, or revocation."
Colo. Laws 1927, C. 114, § 2(5) similarly covers a power in the settlor
alone, or with others, to revest himself with the property.
'In re Fosdick's Estate, 139 Atl. 318 (1927); Trust Co. of Norfolk v.
Commonwealth, 151 Va. 883, 145 S. E. 326 (1928) (taxable). Contra: In re
Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924) ; and cases cited 49 A. L. R.
857 (927).
I See 49 A. L. R. 867 (1927) for list of cases. And see Colo. Sess. Laws
1927, c. 114 § 2(2) expressly covering the situation.
I A trust created by A to pay the premiums on the life of B for the benefit
of C raises problems, under the income tax, similar to the ordinary insurance
trust created by the insured.
" REVENu Acr OF 1928, § 167, 45 STAT. 840 (1928), 26 U. S. C. § 2167
(Supp. 1928) : "Where any part of the income of a trust is or may be applied
to the payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on the life of the
grantor . . . such part of the income of the trust shall be included in
computing the net income of the grantor." "May be" would seem to include
a case where the trustee has the discretionary right to apply the income to the
policies but is not bound to do so.
1 Ibid. § 167.
' Ibid § 166: "Where the grantor of a trust has, at any time during the
taxable year, either alone or in conjunction with any person not a beneficiary
of the trust, the power to revest in himself title to any part of the corpus of
the trust, then the income of such part of the trust for such taxable year shall
be included in computing the net income of the grantor." Held constitutional
as applied to a trust created before the passage of the act. Corliss v. Bowers,
34 F. (2d) 656 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
" RVXT'E AcT OF 1928, sura note 166, § 162(b) ; cf. McCaughn v. Girard
Trust Co., i9 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927). Note that this results in double
exemptions.
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Where it is payable in the discretion of the trustee, it is taxable to
the beneficiary if actually paid over. 170 Where the surplus income
is to be accumulated, or, in the exercise of the trustee's discretion,
it is accumulated, it is taxable to the trustee, 17' the estate being
allowed the exemption of a single person. 72  Dividends, etc.,
received from insurance companies during the life of the insured
are not taxable as income, unless they exceed the aggregate pre-
miums or consideration paid (whether or not during the taxable
year) .17 After the death of the insured, the proceeds paid over
are not taxable income, but, if they are held by the insurer under
an agreement to pay interest, the interest is taxable income.1 74  Of
course, if the trust continues, the income of the augmented trust
will be taxed in the usual fashion.
Since the Federal Income Tax is graduated, a considerable
saving is sometimes possible through the creation of an insurance
trust. For example, on net incomes over $ioo,ooo there is a
twenty per cent surtax on the excess over $ioo,ooo, in addition to
a five per cent normal tax on the excess over $8,ooo. On the
other hand, there is no surtax on incomes of $io,ooo or under.
Hence if a settlor creates a trust in which the income is taxable to
a trust or beneficiary whose net income will still be less than
$io,ooo, he saves the twenty per cent surtax on that sum. If the
income of the trust or beneficiary is over $io,ooo, there is still a
considerable saving, since the surtax varies with the amount of
the income. If the income of the trust or beneficiary is less than
$8,ooo, there is a similar saving on the normal tax.
State Income Taxes Th
There are no express provisions as to who bears the burden
on the income used to pay the premiums. In New York the sur-
rogate has held them taxable to the insured, in a trust on the
"I° REvEN E AcT OF 1928, supra note i66, § 162(C).
'Ibid. § 16i(b).
i'n Ibid. § I63(a).
-1 Ibid. § 22(b) (2).
'71 bid. § 22(b) (i).
"," Del., Mass., Miss., Mo., N. H., N. D., N. Y., Okla., S. C., Va., and Wisc
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life of the settlor's son.1 76  This is a peculiar decision. Consider
the case of a rich uncle creating a large trust on the life of his
poor nephew, for the benefit of the nephew's children; would the
nephew have to bear the burden? Could he, unless there was suf-
ficient surplus income to cover the tax? Suppose the trust con-
tained a provision for the use of all surplus income for the pur-
chase of additional policies? It would seem that the insured is a
mere figurehead. In New Hampshire the tax would fall on the
ultimate beneficiary, if ascertained and an inhabitant of the
state.177  In the rest of the states it would seem that the income
would be taxable to the trustee, probably by way of analogy to an
accumulation. This seems to be the most equitable method, and,
incidentally, it would probably bring more revenue to the state,
since there would be no exemptions for dependents. Where the
surplus income is actually paid or is payable, though this is not
done, it is taxable to the beneficiary. However, in New York,
where the trustee has a discretion as to the distribution, it is tax-
able to him, although he actually pays it over to some benefici-
ary.'17  A majority of the states grant full exemption to policy
returns during the life of the insured.' 79 After the death of the
insured the federal provisions generally apply.
CONCLUSION
A subject like insurance trusts reflects the peculiar difficulty
of writing anything adequate about a contemporary business topic,
if one restricts his discussion largely to legal material. The lawyer
dealing with insurance trusts is first faced with the problem of
drafting instruments. He needs, of course, to consider possible
legal complications, but he must also take into account the business
situation of the parties. If this article were really complete it
would attempt to apply its suggestions to some of the concrete
tasks of the legal draftsman.
76 In re Hartman, supra note 88.
I-N. H. Laws 1926, c. 65, § 9. See also MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) C. 62,
§ Io.
' People v. Gilchrist, 244 N. Y. 56, 154 N. E. 821 (1926),
'Del. Laws 1929, c. 8, § 3a (2). South Carolina has a limited exemption
like the federal tax.
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A second criticism which might be advanced may be less
valid. It may be urged that it is impossible to write a useful legal
article about an institution that has never been before the courts
for interpretation of its powers and privileges. The chances of
error or irrelevance are certainly present. Nevertheless the chal-
lenge seems worth accepting. If the combined acuteness of those
interested in insurance trust problems is sufficient, the law of the
subject may continue to be made almost indefinitely outside the
scope of actual legal decision.
APPENDIX
Those states having no accumulations statute are governed by the
local rule against perpetuities.
State Perpetuities Accumidations
Alabama Lands may be conveyed to Trusts or estates "for the
the wife or children, and p u r po se of accumulation
heirs of the body of the only" are void ab initio if
survivors, if they come of they exceed ten years; ex-
age, and, in default thereof, cept the case of a minority.
over; but conveyances to Ibid. § 6914.
others are limited to three No provision as to the dis-
lives in being at the date of position of the released in-
the conveyance, plus IO years. come.
AL. CIV. CODE (1928)
§ 6y2.
Alaska Common law None
Arizona Two lives in being, plus Realty: Valid during a mi-
twenty-one years. ARIZ. Civ. nority. ARIZ. Crv. CoDE
CODE (913) §§4680, 4681; (1913) § 4702.
Ariz. Laws Ip2i, c. 141. Personalty: None.
No provision as to the dis-
position of the released in-
come.
Arkansas Common law None
California Lives in being, plus a minor- Valid for a minority. The
ity or an absolute period of released income goes to the
twenty-five years. CAr Cirv. presumptive holder of the
CODE (Deering, i923) §§ 715, next eventual estate. Ibid.
771, 772. § 733.
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State Perpetuities Accumdations
Common law
Common law
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Hawaii Common law None
Idaho Lives in being, plus a minor- None
ity. IDAHO C o M P. STAT.
(919) §§ 5335, 5340.
Illinois Common law The Thellusson Act, even in-
cluding the saving clauses
for debts and portions (c. 3,
par. 145). Provision as to
the disposition of the re-
leased income similar to
Thellusson Act. See ILL.
STAT. ANN. (913) § 189.
Indiana Realty: Lives in being, plus Realty: None. Ibid. § 1217.
a minority. Personalty: Valid during a
Personalty: Lives in being. minority.
IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, No provision as to disposi-
1926) § 12171. Section 13416 tion of released income.
requires the measuring lives
to be specified.
Iowa Lives in being, plus twenty- None
one years. IOWA CODE (1927)
§ 10127.
Kansas Common law None
Kentucky Lives in being, plus twenty- None
one years, plus ten months.
Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1915)
§ 236o.
Common law
Lives in being, plus twenty-
one years. D. C. CODE (1925)
§ 1023.
Common law
Lives in being, plus twenty-
one years, plus gestation.
GA. ANN. CODE (Michie,
1926) § 3678.
Florida
Georgia
None
None
None
None
None
None
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State Perpetuities Accumulations
Louisiana Unknown as such; section i6 Unknown
of the constitution forbids
the creation of trust estates,
except that the legislature
may authorize them, pro-
vided (a) they terminate
within ten years, (b) they
terminate within ten years of
the majority of a natural
person.
Maine Common law None
Maryland Common law None
Massachusetts Common law, plus limitation None
of trusts of realty to thirty
years. MAss. GEN. LAWS
(1921) § 18435.
Michigan Realty: Two lives, plus mi- Realty: Valid during a mi-
nority. MicH. CoMP. LAWS nority. Ibid. § 11555.
(Cahill, 1915) §§11533, Personalty: None.
11534. The released income goes to
Personalty: Common law. the presumptive holder of the
next eventual estate.
Minnesota Two lives, plus twenty-one Realty: Valid during a i-
years. MINN. STAT. (Mason,, nority. Ibid. § 8067.
1927) §§ 8044, 8045, 8046. Personalty: None.
The released income goes to
the presumptive holder of
the n ex t eventual estate.
Ibid. § 8o7o.
Mississippi Common law. But see Miss. None
ANN. CODE (Hemingway,
1927) §224.
Missouri Common law None
Montana Realty: Lives in being, plus Realty: None.
a minority. MONT. REv. Personalty: Valid during a
CODES (Choate, ig2) minority. Ibid. §§671o-6713.
§§ 6705, 6706. The released income goes to
Personalty: Lives in being. the presumptive holder of
Ibid. §§ 6734, 6736. the next eventual interest.
Ibid. § 6715.
Nebraska Common law None
Nevada Common law None
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State
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Perpetuities
Common law
Common law
Realty: Lives in being, plus
a minority. N. D. ComP.
LAWS ANN. (1913) § 5287.
Personalty: Lives in being.
Ibid. § 5315.
Accumndations
None
None
None
Common law
Common law. But see N. M.
ANN. STAT. (1915) § 4763.
Realty: Two lives in being,
plus a minority.
Personalty: Two lives in be-
ing. N. Y. ANN. CONS.
LAWS (2d ed. 1917) 7293
et seq., 73r3 et seq.
Ohio Realty: Lives in being. Oio None
GEN. CODE (Page, 1926)
§ 86z
Personalty: In doubt-prob-
ably common law.
Oklahoma Realty: Lives in being, plus None
a minority. 0 x L A. CoMP.
STAT. ANN. (i92I) § 8410.
Personalty: Lives in being.
Ibid. § 8413.
Oregon Common law None
Pennsylvania Common law ReEnactment of the Thellus-
son Act.
Provision for the disposition
of the released income simi-
lar to Thelluson Act.
Porto Rico Probably common law None
Rhode Island Common law None
South Carolina Common law None
Realty: Valid during a mi-
nority.
Personalty: Valid during a
minority.
The released income goes to
the presumptive holder of
the next eventual estate.
None
Realty: Valid during a mil-
nority. Ibid. § 5291.
Personalty: Valid during a
minority. Ibid.
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Perpetuities
Lives in being, plus a minor-
ity. S. D. REv. CODE (I919)
§§ 294, 322.
Common law
Common law
Common law
Common law
Common law
Common law
Common law
Lives in being, plus thirty
years. Wis. STAT. (1927)
§ 23o.r5.
State
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Accumulations
Valid during a minority.
Ibid. § 299.
The released income goes to
the presumptive holder of
the next eventual estate.
Ibid. § 3o3.
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
Realty: Valid for a minority.
Personalty: N one. Ibid.
§ 230.37.
The released income goes to
the presumptive holder of
the n ex t eventual estate.
Ibid. § 23o.i4.
